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his paper is an attempt to explore the meaning and significance of political 
participation within (a) the conceptual framework of democratic citizenship and 
(b) debates surrounding representative democracy.  It consists of three parts; the 
first examines the idea of representative democracy and the manner in which 
democratic politics may be sought to be crafted as a continuum between representation 
and participation; the second looks at the global experience and experiments in electoral 
designs and political reservation for women; and the third examines debates on 
women’s political participation and representation in India along with election data to 
identify possible patterns, followed by a discussion of the ways in which civil society 
organisations have sought to address themselves to reforming the electoral system, in 
particular by addressing the voter or empowering her through specific rights.  
The defining feature of citizenship, distinguishing it from subject-hood, is the 
sense of belonging, horizontal camaraderie, and full and equal membership in the 
political community.  The latter derives not only from the equal protection of the 
autonomous space of the individual, but also through an ethic of participation. The 
ethic of participation in turn makes for thick citizenship as distinct from a thin or passive 
notion of citizenship.  Active citizenship is embedded in a continual creation of public 
spaces through dialogue, deliberation, expression and demonstration within a mutually 
agreed framework of democratic norms.  A strand within citizenship theory sees the 
idea of activity and participation as the crux of citizenship, giving it its historical 
validity as a momentum concept, and as a countervailing force against domination in 
all its manifestations, by foregrounding its relational and collective aspects.  
 While the relational aspects of citizenship are expected to unfold within a 
mutually agreed framework of participation comprising meta-rules like constitutions, 
institutions like the courts, representative/political bodies like parliaments, schools, 
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universities, hospitals, etc., as a principle of activity, citizenship may be seen as a 
framework for effecting change, or creating and sustaining an order through which its 
promise of equality may be made effective.  Politics is integral to such a framework, 
since envisaging and moving towards such an order would in many cases, involve a 
radical rupture from existing systems of deliberation, communication, dialogue, 
participation, methods of representation and power sharing.  In other words, 
democratic citizenship is integrally associated with and embedded in notions of 
equality and participation.  Politics in turn is conceived not merely in terms of 
institutions through which an authoritative allocation of values is made, nor only as 
understanding the processes through which power permeates and makes itself manifest 
in society and polity.  Rather, it is understood as processes through which the 
constitution of such power and its institutionalisation may be continually opened up for 
scrutiny and transformative change, in order to make its spread ‘democratic’, and 
coincident with principles of popular sovereignty and horizontal equality.   
Over the years, questions pertaining to representation of groups and the relative 
appropriateness of specific electoral designs and systems for their adequate 
representation have become germane to devising ways of deepening democracy and 
crafting democratic citizenship.  These questions have prompted animated debates 
around the meaning of representation, what constitutes adequate representation, and 
the ways in which it can be achieved.  These debates have generated areas of tension 
around ‘appropriate’ and ‘effective’ electoral systems, compelling a more rigorous 
examination of the ways in which democracies have addressed issues concerning the 
edging out of social groups from the electoral process, and the structural and societal 
constraints that contribute to this. 
Debates around women’s representation in elected bodies and positions of 
political decision-making, and their visibility and participation in the political process 
have been particularly acrimonious.  This is not surprising considering that the debates 
raised issues which threatened to unsettle notions of women’s ‘proper’ roles and place 
in family and society.  The contours of the debate have for long been framed by contests 
over what constitutes politics, and women’s relationship with it.  While feminists have 
differed over the definition of politics, the ways of ‘doing’ it, and the manner in which 
women can charter for themselves a more significant political presence, over the last 
one decade questions regarding the available choices in electoral design and their 
relative effectiveness in assuring women’s representation have begun to be explored 
with greater assurance and confidence.  
Debates around models of representation ultimately have at their core the issue 
of adequacy of the representative democracy, in particular questions around universal 
and differentiated/proportionality models. Apart from the conceptual framework of 
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citizenship, this paper will, therefore, also examine debates around representative 
democracy, in particular (a) the ‘participatory or political deficit’ that representative 
democracy is seen as entailing, especially when viewed in comparison with direct or 
participatory democracy - the elusive classical ideal for modern political systems; (b) the 
‘crisis’ in mediated or representative democracy and the different ways in which the 
crisis is sought to be resolved; and (c) developing a democratic and effective system of 
representation so that groups are adequately represented.  The focus in the examination 
will not only be on ‘appropriate’ systems of representation but also on the ways in 
which the system is able to translate itself into an ‘effective’ system, bridging thereby 
the difference between what Mills calls ‘talking’ and ‘doing’ systems.  This focus, as the 
discussion in the following sections shows, will help build a case for what has been 
called a continuum approach, aimed at linking issues of representation with those of 
participation. 
  
I. Representation and Participation in Democratic Citizenship 
 
Redefining Categories  
 
Given that modern political systems work on the principle of indirect or representative 
rather than direct or participatory democracy, there have been considerable debates 
around how to make representation just, fair and democratic, which is to say, to make it 
reflective of and commensurate with group-differentiated interests. Alongside concerns 
around developing appropriate systems of representation, corresponding anxieties 
around participatory deficit and passive and thin notions of citizenship, which systems 
of (indirect) representation necessarily entail, have persisted.  Some strands have looked 
for a semblance of directness within civil society, envisaging it as a participatory space 
embodying ‘a ceaseless process of political education in citizenship’ (Urbinati 2000, 
758). However, since definitions of civil society vary, radical democrats have exhibited a 
growing concern over the manner in which the public/political and, corresponding to it 
the idea of democratic citizenship and participatory institutions is being redefined 
through a preoccupation with building a strong civil society.  A strong civil society 
focusing on participatory networks built by non-governmental organisations, they 
argue, may ultimately edge out ‘people’, as dominant groups take over, generating 
greater powerlessness and exclusion (Joseph 2003).  The notion of the public as a 
democratically negotiated and, therefore, an inclusive collective space may be effaced in 
such a situation, increasing the vulnerability of disadvantaged groups.  In the light of 
the above, I will examine in the following section feminist engagements with politics, 
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and deriving from these, the ways in which they have attempted to articulate their 
relationship with representative democracy.    
Much of the feminist concern with ‘politics’ and the ‘political’ in recent times  
may be seen as embodying what Anne Phillips has characterised as a ‘double 
movement towards both critique and recuperation’ (Phillips 1998: 4).  The critique may 
well be seen as continuing more or less with the issues raised by the women’s 
movement during the 1960s and 1970s - of a notion of politics that grounded itself in 
gendered oppositional dichotomies and dualities of social life, around the 
private/personal and the public/political.1  At the crux of the feminist critique has been 
the analytical worth of categories spelling oppositional duality, which it has for quite 
some time questioned for being consonant with frameworks of domination, viz., 
patriarchy, or with the ideology and practices of exploitative rule, viz., colonialism.  The 
public and the private, feminists have constantly reminded, can exist as oppositional 
and dichotomous categories only in those contexts where all persons are not equally 
free.  Moreover, they argue that taking the public and private as discrete categories 
without analysing the socio-historical contexts within which they are articulated is 
inaccurate, and also inadequate for explaining social processes since it effaces the 
complexities that actually exist in political and social life.  Feminists have not only 
pointed out the exclusionary nature of these boundaries, but also the ways in which 
women in different historical contexts have either negotiated these boundaries to render 
them permeable, or dismantled them, redefining their constitutive elements and their 
mutual relationships.  As far as recuperation is concerned - the other movement that 
Anne Phillips alludes to - feminists have chosen different paths, either through equal 
access or presence in the public-political, or, alternatively, seeing the personal and 
political as a bridged/breached continuum, reconstituting thereby their relationship and 
content.  At the crux of this reconstruction, however, is not the dissolving of politics as a 
distinct category, but rather a ‘calling back to politics’, bringing in its wake a 
retheorisation of citizenship.  In the history of citizenship the public and the private 
have distinctive and interrelated chronosophies, figuring integrally as Gurpreet 
Mahajan (2003) terms it, as ‘two modes of enhancing democratic citizenship’.  
Conceived as two coeval and co-equal modes of enhancing citizenship, their 
development is no longer seen as antagonistic, but as one of mutual imbrication in an 
ongoing process of democratisation imbued in different historical and cultural contexts 
with different meanings and correlative boundaries. 
                                                          
1 Feminists, in particular Carole Pateman (1991), point out that the public-private divide is generally seen 
as referring only to the distinction between state and economy or state and civil society.  Feminists 
emphasise that the sole allusion to this distinction occludes the further distinction that differentiates the 
state and civil society from the domestic sphere.   
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Immanent in the rethinking of the relationship between the private and the 
public is the ‘relocation’ and ‘reconstitution’ of the abstract citizen.  The process of 
relocation is central to the project of building democratic citizenship, since the abstract, 
unmarked and masked citizen integral to liberalism is constitutive of the dichotomies of 
social and political life.  Following again the method of ‘critique and recuperation’, the 
critique of the abstract citizen may be done on the ground that it conceives of the citizen 
as an  unencumbered, un-embedded, disconnected self, who seeks actualisation not 
through political activity, but through a range of other commitments and activities that 
take place in diverse and loosely-connected associations. Moreover, feminists, along 
with multiculturalists and theorists on the left, have also criticised the ‘uniformity’ and 
‘generality’ that liberal citizenship entails, since it overlooks the inequalities that exist in 
real life. The idea of the un-embedded and unencumbered self, the abstract citizen in 
the liberal framework, has been rejected for advocating a context-free and apolitical 
citizenship - the floating and unconnected individuality of the citizen is not seen as 
conducive to building relational/democratic citizenship.   
Feminists have also shown how the idea of citizenship has been especially 
inimical to women, either excluding them altogether from the political community as in 
the classical tradition, or including them differentially, viz., as citizen consorts in the 
French Revolutionary tradition, or on the basis of their socially useful roles as mothers. 
Women have taken different routes to overcome their exclusion and dismantle the 
differential terms of their inclusion.  In the process, they have subscribed to different 
perspectives on politics, political community and political participation.  Until recently 
the rights discourse had been predominant, with women struggling to achieve equal 
rights with men in the civil, political and social spheres, considering it as crucial to their 
achievement of full citizenship.  While recognising the importance of a rights-based 
approach to equality and changes in law as the means by which to achieve this, 
feminists see the rights discourse as limited, narrowly focused, legalistic, individualistic 
and ‘male inspired’.  There have been two main sources of feminist challenge to a 
rights-based citizenship, centering on (a) political participation, and (b) promoting care 
as a citizenship responsibility. The strand focusing on political participation sees 
citizenship as an aspect of public/political activity, and as embodying the 
transformative potential of democracy.  It looks for women’s inclusion in the public 
sphere as equals, laying emphasis on revitalising/democratising the public sphere 
through communication, speech and action which are seen as empowering, and 
through alliances for a shared common objective (Mouffe 1992).  Thus it is participation 
in the political sphere that is seen as crucial to the full development of women’s 
citizenship as part of what Rian Voet (1998) calls ‘an active and sex-equal citizenship’.  
Perhaps the most forceful case for what can be seen as a feminist civic republican model 
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of citizenship is made by Mary Dietz (1985, 1987), who advocates a vision of citizenship 
which is ‘expressly political and, more exactly, participatory and democratic’.  It is only, 
she contends, when active political participation is valued as an expression of 
citizenship in contrast to the ‘politically barren’ construction of the ‘citizen as bearer of 
rights’ alone that feminists will be able to claim a truly liberatory politics of their own.  
Other feminists sympathetic to Dietz’s vision, such as Anne Phillips (1991, 1993) and Iris 
Marion Young (1990), nevertheless, caution against an uncritical reading of civil 
republicanism, which defines the political in narrow terms and ignores the domestic 
constraints on many women’s political participation (Lister 2003) . 
A second major strand of feminism is, however, sceptical of what they feel is 
merely an ‘add women’ approach, which, while looking for avenues of inclusion into 
the public sphere, does not question its ‘maleness’.  This strand approaches citizenship 
from the vantage point of what women do in the private realm. Questioning the 
patriarchal state, it argues for the inclusion of women’s specific functions into the public 
realm of citizenship, hoping thereby to promote the suppressed private side of the 
public/private divide in the realm of democratic politics (Prokhovnik 1998).  This has 
led to two distinct lines of argument – first, that the private/personal is political which 
implies a continuity of power between the state and the so-called private domains and 
submits them both to the norms of justice and equality of the public realm; and second, 
that of maternalist citizenship which advocates that women should value their 
particular skills and interests, rather than merely entering the bastions of male-defined 
politics on its terms.  This route is in a way a continuation of a form of suffragette 
campaign to re-imagine citizenship and the public sphere in order to encompass 
‘feminine’ values.  By emphasising the ‘public’ role, maternalists like Carol Gilligan, 
Jean Elshtain and Sara Ruddick feel that a degradation of the ‘private’ role, and that of 
the domestic, continues.  They would prefer to see the dismantling of a citizenship 
based on male personalities, and the development of new notions based on the 
‘feminine’ characteristics of love and compassion.   Stressing the superiority of maternal 
qualities of caring, responsibility and compassion as the key elements of citizenship, the 
maternalists dissolve in the process the distinction between male/public and 
female/private facets of life (Elshtain 1981; Gilligan 1982).   
In its recuperation mode, feminist politics concerns itself with comprehending 
the ways in which differentiated citizenship reproduces itself so that it does not silence 
or marginalise women and become a dangerous ‘neutral’ abstraction like the masked 
citizen.  Guarding against this abstraction involves not only a reconstruction of the 
private/public distinction so that its ‘recurring power’ may be rolled back, but also 
entails taking into account the differences that exist among women – of race, class, caste 
etc. – that determine their specific experiences of citizenship.  It is only by 
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comprehending these differences that the specificity of women’s experiences can come 
together in broad political alliances, alliances that are not fragmented along the lines of 
differences nor forged through their occlusion, but rather as struggles that weave them 
together through action and engagement with specific and shared/common experiences 
of oppression.  The association between feminism and a politics of difference is 
particularly marked in Iris Young’s definition of a ‘differentiated citizenship’, which 
explicitly recognises differences of sex, race, class, sexuality or language in order to 
guarantee that all groups are fully included, and Nancy Fraser’s exploration of tensions 
between those struggles for recognition that are most closely associated with identity 
politics, and those struggles for redistribution that arise in the context of traditional 
socialist politics.  In both cases, feminism provides the tools with which to deconstruct 
exclusionary notions of common good, or the class-defined preoccupations of earlier 
struggles for social equality.  It also generates the insights that clarify the importance of 
particular identities, while questioning at the same time the solidity of these identities.  
The issues that are addressed, therefore, do not simply identify a notion of ‘women’s 
politics’ or a politics centering on ‘women’s issues’.  Rather, as Philips points out, they 
hold out the promise of transforming the ways in which we think about any kind of 
politics at all (Phillips 1998: 16).      
While transformative politics is central to the feminist project, it does not 
automatically assume a unity of women in a unified feminist politics.  Feminists like 
Judith Butler have pointed out that as a subject of politics, or a subject of feminist 
politics, ‘women’ as a category does not – and may never – exist.  Arguing that the 
‘unity’ of the category of women is neither presupposed nor desired, Butler points out 
that it would be wrong to assume in advance that there is a category of women that 
simply needs to be filled in with various components of race, class, age, ethnicity and 
sexuality in order to become complete.  Problematising a fixed ‘identity’ premised on 
unity and its relationship with feminist politics, Butler points out that identity is 
ambiguous and should not be treated as a normative goal.  Feminist politics, too, should 
not be seen as emanating necessarily from some ‘stable, unified and agreed-upon 
identity’, and without this compulsory expectation of unified identity, feminist actions 
may ‘well get a quicker start and seem more congenial to a number of “women” (Butler 
1998: 288).  It is important to keep in mind, therefore, following Philips’ framework of a 
feminist politics of recuperation that in the course of engaging in and thinking about 
transformative politics, the political subjectivity of women is continually constituted. 
The difficulties of articulating women and ‘women’s interests’ as a unified 
category cutting across the equality/difference and private/public divide, become all the 
more pronounced where issues of political representation are concerned.  However, as 
Butler herself puts it, the ‘political task is not to refuse representational politics – as if 
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we could’ (ibid: 277).  Following the track of critique and recuperation, it may be 
suggested that politics does matter, but what we understand by politics must first be 
transformed. While feminism provides a much-needed counterweight to the resulting 
cynicism and apathy towards politics, enabling us to think more critically about the 
exclusions still practised under apparent inclusiveness, and enables us to think more 
imaginatively about the many ways in which politics can still be transformed (Phillips 
1998), it is also important to see how, feminism is able to weave into the ‘historical 
present’ or ‘the contemporary field of power’ (Butler 1998: 277) a feminist political 
practice that bridges the gap between the notional ‘woman’ with the diverse women 
that exist in practice. 
 
Towards a continuum 
 
Since this paper takes up issues of representation, participation and democracy, it is 
important to identify first the relationship that it envisages between the three.  The 
delineation of this relationship is important in order to articulate the position that the 
paper puts forth regarding women’s relationship with politics and women’s political 
citizenship within the contours of the existing debate on the relative merits of 
representative and participatory democracy.  As stated at the outset, this paper 
proposes a continuum framework, which bridges the participatory and representative 
models of democracy.  It also argues for a framework of representative democracy that 
brings together the agora model which consists of continually evolving multilayered 
activity, with agonistic politics, which subscribes to recognising difference and plurality 
within a dialogical framework. 
While the complexity of modern societies has made it impossible for democracy 
to be direct, and the distance between the processes of ruling and [those] being ruled 
gets more pronounced as one moves up the layers/tiers of government, the 
participatory model of democracy continues to be influential as an ideal form, 
embodying an elusive state of perfection which one must constantly aspire to emulate, 
and, wherever possible, replicate.  The shift in the paradigms of government, with 
direct participation in ruling giving way to being ruled through representatives, has not 
eroded the normative value of direct democracy, which ironically remains something 
the ‘moderns’ can never have, and yet cannot cease to want (Dunn 1993: 28). This 
uncritical nostalgia for directness in democracy generates corresponding concerns about 
the inadequacy or deficiency of modern representative forms of democracy.2 These 
                                                          
2 Nadia Urbinati (2000) points out that nostalgia may foster resignation, but may also encourage a realistic 
disenchantment towards what is actual.  
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debates have become more pronounced with questions around the issues of equality in 
representation, forms of representation of groups, and the appropriate ways of 
achieving it having become progressively significant.  The above concerns are also 
attended by anxieties about the thin and passive notions of citizenship that 
accompanied the shift from participatory and direct democracy to representative 
democracy.  A lament of ‘crisis’ in representative democracy has emerged in recent 
years, stemming from the assumptions of deficiency and political passivity in 
representative democracy.  Critics of representative democracy consider it a weak form 
of democracy, a poor substitute for self-government and active citizenship.   
The concerns around indirectness and political deficit may be seen as being 
addressed in two ways, each approaching the relationship between representation and 
participation in divergent ways.  The manner in which the question is addressed at each 
level has a special resonance for women and their engagement/relationship with 
politics:  
(a) The universality approach looks at the relationship in terms of cohabitation in 
an inclusive model.  This approach transcends/resolves the anxieties around political 
deficit by pointing to its moral distinctiveness and value.  Focusing on the ways in 
which an articulated public sphere is created through and in the intervening period 
between elections, it points in particular to the ways in which the processes of 
deliberation provide a continuum between the representatives and participation, 
bridging the spatial and temporal gap or the absence of simultaneity between the voting 
and decision-making.  They argue that an articulated public sphere, while filling up the 
temporal hiatus between ‘electoral trials’, also adds to the ideological content of 
elections by going beyond the here and the now to connect with the past and look 
towards the future.  This approach sees both participation and representation as 
significant elements of democracy, and seeks to bridge the distinction between its 
participatory and representative forms by locating them in a framework of dialogue 
instead of any contradictory cohabitation, where the existence of representative 
democracy implies a political and participatory deficit.  The framework of cohabitation 
is constituted by the deliberative character of democracy.  The focus on deliberation 
allows the perception of participation and representation not as two alternative forms of 
democracy, but as related, and as constituting the framework of political action in 
modern democracies.  Seen from this vantage point, the emphasis on the deliberative 
character of modern democracies appears to provide the institutional and socio-cultural 
space within which the various components of political action – from opinions and will-
formation to decision-making take shape (Urbinati 2000: 759). 
(b) The proportionality or group-specific approach sees representation and 
participation as distinctive, but rejects the elevation of participatory democracy as the 
 10 
only ‘real’ form of democracy.  The primary purpose of this approach, therefore, is not 
to devise ways by which representative democracy could as closely as possible replicate 
participatory democracy, but rather to make the problems and patterns of exclusion 
central, instead of the participatory deficit that representative democracy might entail.  
Thus David Plotke states that in a representative democracy, the ‘opposite of 
representation is not participation’, but exclusion (Plotke 1997: 19), and Iris Marion 
Young (Young 1997: 352) considers ‘political representation as both necessary and 
desirable’, concerning herself with exclusion and group-differentiated citizenship (Ibid: 
1989).   
Significantly, both formulations steer clear of the nostalgia for direct democracy 
as the only pure form of democracy, enabling participation.  Moreover, both look for 
frameworks of inclusion with the universalist approach, locating it in public discourses 
and deliberations that intervene and connect periodic ‘electoral trials’, and the group-
specific approach concerning itself with the ways in which a differentiated citizenship 
could make universalism commensurate with proportionality. It would be useful, 
therefore, to weave into the universalism of the first approach the differentiated 
universalism of the group-specific approach so as to address the political and 
democratic deficit that is seen as informing representative democracy.  The concerns 
around passivity may be addressed by seeking a continuum between representation 
and participation, through seeing representation as constitutive of democracy and 
embodying the processes of ‘comprehensive filtering, refining and mediating’, which is 
crucial for ‘political will formation and expression’.  It is this process of mediation that 
opens up room for deliberation and a public discourse that fosters a relationship 
between the assembly and the people, a relationship that gets refreshed and renewed 
with each electoral trial.  Moreover, it is public discourse that bridges the spatial and 
temporal gap between electoral trials, and transcends it to look forward to the future.  
As mentioned earlier, while the deliberative framework works with a notion of 
universality, bringing in more and more people within its integrative framework, the 
group-specific framework works on principles of differentiated universalism to make it 
more compatible with the democratic principles of equality and recognition of 
difference.  One may derive from this framework a notion of politics that is founded on 
principles of agonism, and representation as based on the principle of group-
proportionality.  Yet, proportionality by itself might not bridge the relationship of 
verticality or the gap that exists between citizens and their representatives, a process 
which requires that the agonism of proportionality be wedded to the multilayered 
activity and dialogue that holds together the agora.   Thus, both must go together, since 
proportionality may remain descriptive unless it makes the representative body a 
talking and deliberating body and an acting and governing body, with the purpose of 
 11 
making representation effective, imbued with mutual trust and accountability.3 The 
spatial and temporal gap opened by representation requires a speech filled or 
articulated public sphere, connecting the collective moments of political participation 
that elections embody. The structures of representation are, moreover, layered, in the 
sense that public speech and deliberation is also encompassed by mediated 
participation. The agora paradigm assumes representation as a complex institution 
encompassing several layers of political action that fill the interval between one 
parliamentary election and another.  Representation becomes a ‘course of action’ rather 
than a ‘simple act’ – a practice of political interaction among citizens which goes well 
beyond voting.   
 
 
II. Reservation for women: Frameworks for proportionality  
 
The effective representation of specific groups, women in particular, and the terms of 
their inclusion – as voters and representatives - has been a matter critical to both the 
theory and practice of democracy.  The question of ‘fair representation’ in particular has 
been contentious, when seen in terms of parity or proportionate representation in the 
context of specific numbers or quota.  While the demand for a parity of women and 
men in politics was grounded in the biological differences between them, the rationale 
behind a quota system is women’s historical marginality in politics, and the effects it 
has on the political system (Hust 2004: 35; Siim 2000: 69).  Manifesting the replacement 
of the politics of ideas with a politics of presence, certain influential strands in feminist 
theory have stressed the importance of women’s presence in public/political/decision-
making bodies in a ‘critical mass’.  While the notion of critical mass subscribes to the 
view that the presence of women as a ‘critical mass’ would somehow set in motion a 
process that would engender politics, the difference between presence as a ‘critical 
mass’ and ‘critical action’ has been emphasised by others, foregrounding the necessity 
of moving beyond numbers into the realm of transformative actions (Dahlerup 2001: 
108).   
                                                          
3 Criticising mirror or descriptive representation, Hannah Pitkin suggests that the metaphors of 
descriptive representation were most commonly found among those who regarded representative 
democracy as a poor substitute, and who therefore looked to a more ‘accurate’ or pictorial representation 
of the electorate as a way of approximating the older citizen assemblies, instead of recognising the 
qualitatively new elements that entered into democracy with the development of representative 
institutions (Phillips 1995: 34).  Pitkin argues that proportional representation, while professing equality 
of representation, may actually be insincere, because it can eventually become a way of using minorities’ 
representation to legitimise the majority’s decisions.  It meticulously reflects the social topography but, at 
the same time, makes the assembly into a ‘talking rather than acting, de-liberating rather than governing 
body’ (Pitkin 1967: 86).   
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Concerns around enabling women’s equal access to the political process and 
with offering technical assistance for reforming the electoral system and management of 
the electoral process have focused attention on gender equality relating to (a) design of 
the electoral systems: analysis of the implications for women’s representation of 
different options in electoral systems (including the number of seats, the size of electoral 
districts, whether proportional representation is adopted, etc.); (b) voter registration: 
supporting approaches to registration and training of officials to ensure that women get 
on the list on an equal basis with men; (c) voter education: ensuring that education 
reaches women as well as men, and promotes respect in the community for women’s 
equal rights to participate; and (d) access to the polls: promoting approaches that 
reduce risks to voting that could reduce women’s participation, e.g., separate queues in 
polling booths for women (Schalkwyk and Woroniuk 1998).     
While questions of women’s representation in elected bodies and positions of 
political decision-making, and their visibility in the political process have been raised 
for a long time now, those regarding the available choices in electoral design and their 
relative effectiveness in assuring adequate representation for women have begun to be 
asked relatively recently.  Different kinds of electoral designs and political and electoral 
procedures have subsequently been examined, so as to craft out a system that gives 
adequate representation to women, facilitating their emergence as a critical mass.  
Among these, the ‘quota’ system or reservation of seats in elected bodies, aiming at 
‘guaranteed outcome’ rather than providing an equal or level playing field as in the 
gender parity list system for parties, has become the most contentious. While there have 
been divergent positions on the quota system and its implications for feminist politics, a 
comparative study of electoral systems has shown that in electoral systems based on the 
principle of First Past the Post, quota is perhaps the best way of assuring the presence of 
women in substantial numbers in representative bodies.  The Platform for Action 
arrived at the Fourth UN World Conference on Women in Beijing in 1995 has become 
an important reference point for the demand for quotas by women’s movement 
worldwide.  In many ways the Beijing programme of action reflects the general shift in 
the way in which participation was being envisaged in different UN instruments.  In the 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, the United Nations emphasised measures ‘to 
assist in the strengthening and building of institutions relating to human rights, 
strengthening of a pluralistic civil society, and the protection of groups which have 
been rendered vulnerable’.4 In this context it identified as ‘of particular importance’, 
                                                          
4 The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action was adopted by the World Conference on Human 
Rights on 25 June 1993.  The Conference was convened by the United Nations General Assembly from 14 
– 25 June to reaffirm the promotion and protection of human rights as a matter of priority for the 
international community. 
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‘assistance [to be] provided upon the request of Governments for the conduct of fair 
and free elections, including assistance in the human rights aspects of elections and 
public information about elections’ (Vienna Declaration Part II, para 67).  The provision 
of conditions ensuring fair and free elections was envisaged within the broad 
framework of basic human rights, and democracy was seen as the condition in which 
these rights can be realised, while assisting in the election process was seen as helping 
the process of democratisation.  Democratisation in turn was seen not only as ushering 
in political democracy, but also as broadening and deepening it through the inclusion of 
vulnerable groups. The United Nations booklet ‘Human Rights and Elections’, part of 
its professional training series, lay down the legal, technical and human rights aspects 
of elections, emphasising non-discrimination and inclusion.  While emphasising equal, 
universal and non-discriminatory suffrage as a basic element of fair elections, the 
booklet also highlighted instruments providing for non-discriminatory and positive 
measures, e.g.,  the Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women 
(Article 4[a] and [c]), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
Against Women (Article 7[a] and [b]) and the Convention on the Political Rights of 
Women (Articles II and III)  (United Nations 1994). 
Like the Vienna Declaration, which stressed the importance of rolling back 
discrimination and structures that generate group-vulnerability by strengthening 
institutions, the Beijing Platform of Action suggested a discursive shift from women to 
structures and institutions. The justification of reservation is mostly made with 
reference to some kind of historically experienced or inherent group disadvantage, 
vulnerability, inadequacy or weakness.  In the case of women’s representation, while 
previously the focus was on women’s lack of resources or lack of will to participate, the 
Beijing platform talked about structures of exclusion - ‘discriminatory attitudes and 
practices’ and ‘unequal power relations’ that have led to the under-representation of 
women in arenas of political decision-making.  Importantly, in the new discourse the 
responsibility for promoting change has shifted from the individual woman to those 
institutions that are expected to take action to identify and correct the causes of 
women’s under-representation. While suggesting affirmative action as a possible means 
of attaining the goal of women’s equal participation in political decision-making, the 
Beijing Platform recommended that governments use ‘specific targets and 
implementing measures…if necessary through positive action’.  Moreover, the platform 
attempts to expand the discourse on critical mass by focusing on equal representation 
rather than insisting on any minimum representation.  It demands a commitment from 
governments to ‘take measures, wherever appropriate, in electoral systems that 
encourage political parties to integrate women in elective and non-elective public 
positions in the same level and at the same levels as men’, and directs political parties to 
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‘consider examining party structures and procedures to remove all barriers that directly 
or indirectly discriminate against the participation of women’.5   
Theoretically and historically, two kinds of tracks have been considered for 
increasing women’s representation in elected bodies, viz., the incremental track and the 
fast track.  The two tracks are identified with two distinct discourses.  The incremental 
track recognises the existence of social prejudices and the fact that women do not have 
the same political resources as men.  Following a linear view of progress, it assumes 
that as society progresses, with the increase in its resources and people’s access to it, 
gradually women’s representation in decision-making and other public bodies would 
increase.  The fast track rejects gradualism and even the assumption that an increase in 
resources might lead to equal representation.  It sees exclusion and discrimination as 
the core of the problem, and believes that equality will not come by itself and will have 
to be pushed.6  The fast track and the fast track policy constitute an important part of 
the new direction set out in the Beijing platform. 
Reservations or electoral quotas are fast tracks to the equal representation of 
women.  In the debates on gender quotas, the high representation of women in 
Scandinavian parliaments is commonly used as an argument in support of the 
introduction of gender quotas. Drude Dahlerup, however, considers these examples 
misleading, since the trajectory of women’s representation in these countries may be 
seen as having followed the incremental track.  The representation of women in 
Denmark, Norway and Sweden occurred in the 1970s and in Iceland in the 1980s, all 
before the introduction of quotas.  Moreover, gender quotas in these countries was 
voluntary and never a legal requirement, and used only by some political parties at the 
centre and the left.  It took approximately 60 years from women’s enfranchisement for 
Denmark, Sweden and Norway to cross the 20 per cent threshold, and 70 years to reach 
30 per cent.  This means that the Nordic countries, in spite of the high level of women’s 
representation, can no longer be considered the model, or at any rate the only model for 
increasing women’s representation (Dehlerup 2006).  
At present only 16 per cent of the world’s parliamentarians are women, and 
according to the feminist movements as well as feminist theory, this shortage of women 
in political institutions may have serious consequences for the articulation of women’s 
interest and for the legitimacy of democratic institutions (Phillip 1995; Norris 2004).   
Today around 40 countries have introduced gender quotas in elections to national 
parliament, either by means of constitutional amendment or by changing the electoral 
laws (legal quotas).  In more than 50 other countries major political parties have 
                                                          
5 See, for details, Drude Dahlerup (2006). 
6 Ibid.  
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voluntarily set out quota provisions in their own statutes (party quotas).  Even if quota 
provisions are often controversial, the use of the quota tool to make historical leaps or 
jump starts in women’s representation is becoming a global trend.  In 2003 Rwanda 
surpassed Sweden as the number one country in the world in terms of women’s 
parliamentary representation – women received 48.8 per cent of the seats as opposed to 
45.3 per cent in Sweden.  Rwanda has come to signify a new trend in world politics, i.e., 
the use of gender quotas as the fast track to gender balance in politics, through which 
countries as disparate as Argentina, Uganda, South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
France and Costa Rica have attempted to rapidly change women’s historical under-
representation in political institutions. 
 
The following table shows parliaments with more than 30 per cent women in rank 
order. 
Country Women in national 
parliament (%) 
Quota type Electoral system 
Rwanda 48.8  (2003) Legal quota 
(Constitutional) 
List PR 
Sweden 45.3  (2002) Party quota List PR 
Norway 37.9  (2005) Party quota List PR 
Finland 37.5  (2003) No quota List PR 
Denmark 36.9  (2005) No quota List PR 
Netherlands 36.7  (2003) Party quota List PR 
Cuba 36.0  (2003) No quota Two Rounds 
Mozambique 36.0  (2004) Party quota List PR 
Spain 36.0  (2004) Party quota List PR 
Costa Rica 35.5  (2002) Legal quota (law) List PR 
Belgium 35.3  (2003) Legal quota (law) List PR 
Argentina 33.5  (2003) Legal quota 
(Constitutional) 
List PR 
Austria 33.3  (2002) Party quota List PR 
South Africa 32.8  (2004) Party quota List PR 
Germany 31.8  (2005) Party quota MMP 
Burundi 30.5  (2005) Legal quota (law) List PR 
Iceland 30.2  (2003) Party quota List PR 
Key for Electoral Systems:1 
Proportional Representation: List PR 
Mixed Member Proportional: MMP 
Source: International IDEA and Stockholm University (2005) cited in Dahlerup (2006) 
 
A question that may well be asked here is - to what extent do electoral quotas fit 
or accommodate into, rather than challenge dominant conceptions of citizenship?  
Electoral quotas or reservations for women clearly involve a demand for women’s 
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increased participation in public-sphere activities. An influential strand within feminist 
theory challenges the norms of ‘public’ citizenship and questions the ‘passivity’ 
ascribed to non-political and non-economic/productive activity.  While the active or 
participatory model which associates rights and entitlements to performance or practice 
of citizenship, drawing from the civic republican model, is dominant among American 
feminist theorists, prioritising as it does women’s public-ness or their public roles to 
their domestic activities, other forms of citizenship have focused attention on social and 
cultural rights, the associated welfare regime and responsibilities of the state, and 
claims for the recognition of women’s contribution in the domestic sphere (Bacchi 
2006).7 There is, therefore, a degree of ambivalence among feminists, particularly from 
Eastern European countries where the strategy of electoral quotas is concerned.  
Feminists have sought to overcome the dichotomies structuring the contours of the 
debate by arguing that depending on the context, specific forms of citizenship may take 
precedence.  While the notion of context-based or context-sensitive citizenship may 
facilitate the alleviation of the debate to a level of co-existence of contrasting arguments, 
on the issue of quotas feminists have insisted, that it actually cuts across the entrenched 
dichotomies that have inhibited women’s claims to citizenship, irrespective of their 
form.  First, they straddle the public/private divide by insisting that women, because 
they are women, deserve representation; second, they draw attention to the importance 
of having a voice in defining the nature of citizenship rights and responsibilities (Bacchi 
2006: 42).  The suggestion that quotas cut across the public/private divide challenges the 
dichotomy of the mind/body implicit in the ‘politics of ideas’, which was challenged by 
the counter-argument of a ‘politics of presence’.  The insistence on presence in critical 
numbers, or a ‘critical mass’ to set in motion significant change, has led to yet another 
measure of transformative change – ‘critical act’ – put forth by feminists in the context 
of Scandinavian politics, where women have a substantial presence.8 While the critical 
                                                          
7 Western European feminists contrast welfare regimes, using as their chief point of differentiation 
whether or not a male breadwinner model of social organisation is in place (Orloff 1993).  Some 
Scandinavian feminists (Hernes 1987; Siim 1990) insist that ‘an adequate account of contemporary 
citizenship’ must grasp the interplay between material rights, multi-level participation, and political 
identities’ (Lister 2003:40).  In Eastern Europe where the dismantling of communism has meant the 
reduction of social rights and increasing reliance on the family, women are trying to establish a claim for 
recognition in the domestic sphere (Havelkova 2000).  In Latin America, Virginia Vargas (2002: 215), a 
prominent feminist activist, argues that ‘[t]hose who campaign for political rights while neglecting or 
ignoring social or cultural rights…sustain and legitimize the exclusionary character of existing 
democracies and formations of citizenship’.  See for a discussion on these issues Carol Bacchi. ‘Arguing 
for and against quotas’ in Dahlerup (2006). 
8 In nuclear physics, a ‘critical mass’ refers to the quantity needed to start a chain reaction, an irreversible 
take-off into a situation or process. By analogy, the presence of women in substantial numbers is required 
for the possibility of change.     
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mass theory may be inhibited by its reference to minimum and relative numbers, 
weakened in turn by expectations of a turning point, the theory of ‘critical act’ put 
forward by Drude Dahlerup hopes to diminish weakness, by shifting attention to 
actions rather than numbers, actions which involve men as well as women, for 
transformative change.9   
 
III. Frameworks of women’s political participation in India 
 
Debates on women’s vote and representation 
 
Despite a political consensus on women's equal political rights publicly articulated 
through the Karachi Declaration in 1931, a sense of anxiety over the impending havoc 
this would perpetrate in the family and society was clearly discernable in the debates on 
women's franchise in India.  References to the bazaar women and prostitutes - the 
'creatures' on the streets - were frequently made to dissuade public expressions of 
women’s political equality.  Concerns about the potential hazards that awaited women 
from the zenana in the cloistered voting booths were similarly expressed.  Colonial 
officials, apart from wishing to stay clear of the 'internal' matters of the Indians and 
apprehensive of provoking 'religious' sentiments, were sceptical of the administrative 
feasibility of the task of registering women as voters.  Purdah was cited as a reason that 
would impede their inclusion in the list of voters. 
 The issue of franchise became important in the context of the promise for 
constitutional reforms made by the British government towards the close of World War I.  
Montagu's announcement in the House of Commons on 20 August 1917, promising the 
gradual development of ‘self-governing institutions’ and the ‘progressive realisation of 
responsible government', was instrumental in shaping demands for broadening the 
existing contours of franchise. Organised activism by women for the right to vote and for 
representation in the promised self-governing bodies emerged in this context, in a peculiar 
relation of collusion and conflict with a nationalist demand for voting rights.10  It gained 
                                                          
9 Drude Dahlerup defines a ‘critical act’ as one which would change the position of the minority 
considerably and lead to further changes in policies.  Critical acts would involve increasing the 
representation of women through quotas, while simultaneously developing gender-sensitive platforms 
for change (Dahlerup 2001).  
10 The turn of the 19th century witnessed some results of the dissemination of education to women,  
however restricted, and the impact of the ideas of reformers in the changes taking place in the status of 
women.  This was manifested in the emergence of women’s organisations, when women entered public 
life in larger numbers than ever before.  This period saw the birth of organisations such as the Women’s 
Indian Association (this was later merged in the All India Women’s Conference), the National Council for 
Women in India and The All India Women’s Conference.  It also opened a new chapter in the women’s 
movement for equality.  All these organisations agitated for reforms to broaden the eligibility criteria to 
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pace with subsequent reform declarations, and all but withered away in the 1940s.  The 
decline in the 1940s was symptomatic of the unyielding primacy that the issue of political 
independence had assumed.  It is important to point out at the outset that, while a small 
percentage of men could vote on the basis of a property qualification, women in India had 
no voting rights. While the removal of sex disqualification formed the basis of women's 
demand for voting rights, it is significant that women's organisations which took up the 
issue with the colonial government, placed it within the larger agenda of universal 
franchise. ‘Fair field and no favours' was the preferred slogan. 
 For a long time in the course of the struggle for political rights, women activists had 
steadfastly refused to endorse the idea of a ‘community’ of women with special needs and 
interests distinct from men, and requiring, therefore, special provisions.  A difference 
among women became apparent, however, on the issue of reservation of seats for women 
in provincial legislatures.  Begum Shah Nawaz and Radhabai Subbarayan, who were 
appointed by the government as representatives of women at the first Round Table 
Conference at London, in a departure from the professed position of women's 
organisations, expressed their support for special reservations, though as a temporary 
measure. 
 Unlike the religious minorities or special interest groups like the landed aristocracy 
and industry, Begum Shah Nawaz and Radhabai Subbarayan did not couch their 
demands for reservation in terms of a ‘wider distribution of power’ or a ‘declaration of 
rights' enumerated in a way that made them ‘unassailable by a majority community'.11 On 
the contrary, they stressed the numerical strength of women and framed their demands 
not in terms of a sharing of power, but in terms of responsibility.  Pointing out that ‘the 
political future and welfare of a great section [women]' lay in their `bear[ing] the full share 
of responsibility in the new India',12 they drew attention to the inefficacy of the existing 
franchise qualifications in enabling women to exercise their responsibility.13  Significantly, 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
include more women voters.  The AIWC, formed in 1926, was set up by women, in order to organise 
themselves to pursue reforms in the system of education through linkages with other women 
organisations.  Margaret Cousins who was involved with the organisation, issued an appeal in 
newspapers and wrote to over 500 women who were renowned educationists, or social reformers, or 
associated with relevant organisations.  It entered into the struggle for the right to vote, joining hands 
with the WIA (formed by Dorothy Jinarajadasa on 8 May 1917 at Adyar) and the NWI formed in 1925.  A 
demand for women’s franchise was initiated in 1917 when a deputation of Indian women led by Sarojini 
Naidu presented to the British Parliament a demand for the enfranchisement of women on the basis of 
equality with men. 
11 See the debate in the Sub-Committee no. III (Minorities) of the Round Table Conference.  See Indian 
Round Table Conference, 12 November 1930 – 19 January 1931, Proceedings of Sub-Committees, London 
(1931: 81). 
12 Deposition to the Franchise Sub-Committee by Mrs.Subbarayan, a government appointed delegate at 
the Round Table Conference at London 1930-31, ibid. (1931: 231). 
13 Memorandum on the Political Status of Women Under the New Constitution by Mrs. Subbarayn and 
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both Shah Nawaz and Subbarayan distanced themselves from the minorities in the meeting 
of the Minorities Sub-Committee of the Round Table.  Speaking as women, they urged the 
men to be united in a common citizenship.  Begum Shahnawaz persuaded them on behalf 
of the women of India to come to a settlement: ‘...as sisters we expect of you, as daughters 
we beg of you, as mothers we demand of you...'.14 The present, they pointed out, had its 
difficulties and difference.  It was the wonderful future – the development of a common 
Indian citizenship and Indian nationhood – towards which they asked the men to direct 
the present.15 
 The Lothian Committee effectively plugged the opposition of nationalist women’s 
organisations to the reservation of seats by recommending a reservation of 2-10 per cent 
seats for women in the provincial legislatures for at least 10 years.16  In particular, the 
communal award, with its provision for communally divided electorates for women, 
drove a wedge through the public face of unity that the women's organisations had 
displayed. At least three layers existed within the unity of women on this issue: (a) the 
nationalist patriots, deriving their identity as women from a common and equal 
citizenship uniting the nation; (b) women identified as a group apart, with special interests 
requiring special provisions; (c) minority women, as a further specialisation of interest 
within the category of women.17  It should be pointed out that the emergence of a category 
of women associated with the reservation of seats was shortly overshadowed by the 
nationalist patriotism of women citizens after 1930, under the overriding influence of 
Gandhi and the national movement.  The question of the reservation of seats put women’s 
organisations in a situation where the ideal of citizenship towards which the demand for 
franchise worked was fractured by the demands for special provisions emanating from 
among their own ranks.  The introduction of the minority women as differentiated-
women problematised both the unitary identity of women as well as the nationalist 
patriotism of women citizens.  In significant ways, the issue of reserved seats at this 
juncture also constituted a moment of contest between the nationalist men and an 
influential section of organised women who were against reservation of seats.  The 
communal award of 1932 introducing separate electorates and including the provision of 
reserved seats for women was resisted by Gandhi as divisive.  While women were 
strongly of the opinion that it would be difficult for them to contest elections successfully 
without such provisions, they supported Gandhi so that they may not weaken the 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
Begum Shah Nawaz, Appendix VII, ibid. (1931: 290). 
14 Deposition by Begum Shah Nawaz at the meeting of the Minorities Sub-Committee.  Indian Round 
Table Conference, Proceedings of Sub-Committees (1931: 290, 80). 
15 Radhabai Subbarayan speaking at the meeting of the Minorities Sub-Committee, ibid (1931: 80-81, 290) 
16 Report of the Indian Franchise Committee 1932, cmd. 4086, Vol I : 86. 
17 For a discussion of these points, see Roy (2005). 
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nationalist demand.  However, when the Poona Pact of September 1932 providing 
reserved seats for the depressed classes within the total Hindu constituency was accepted 
by Congress leaders including Gandhi as a compromise measure, the move was seen by 
women activists as a betrayal.  The Poona Pact and other communal awards were 
criticised as divisive for women.  The Government of India Act of 1935 gave legal sanction 
to the principle of group representation, giving women along with other categories 
reserved seats in elected Provincial Councils.18      
 The contest over the question of reservation of seats for women came up for 
examination again in the 1970s, when the Committee on the Status of Women in India (CSWI 
1974) looked at the political status of women.   The Towards Equality report, by which name 
the report is more commonly known, summarised the various positions and demands 
from women’s groups and academic scholars on the issue of reservation. Those in favour 
of reservation drew attention to the deeply entrenched discriminatory structures that 
inhibited women’s representation in political bodies, and to the fact that the number of 
women legislators was declining as a result of the political parties’ reluctance to sponsor 
women candidates.   While pointing at the ‘force of tradition’ that impeded women’s 
‘coming into their own ‘politically’’, they emphasised that the improvement of women’s 
political status was inextricably related with the ‘problem of socio-economic change and 
broadening the political elite structure’.  They recommended a 30 per cent reservation of 
seats in the legislative bodies as a transitional measure to dismantle the existing structure 
of inequalities (CSWI 1974: 302-305).19 Strong opposition to the suggestion came, however, 
from representatives of political parties and most women legislators, who argued that 
reservation would be a retrograde step from the principle of equality, and would be 
resisted by most women for being equated with the socially backward communities, since 
all women do not suffer from the same disabilities as under-privileged groups.  The CSWI 
could not agree on the principle of reservation.  The majority rejected the demand for 
reservation, continuing with the nationalist women’s arguments of ‘fair field and no 
favours’, and following what has in the earlier section been identified as the ‘incremental 
track’.20 Three members of the Committee – Lotika Sarkar, Neera Dogra and Vina 
Mazumdar – dissented, however, arguing that the Committee was being unwise in 
ignoring the need for institutionalised measures to eliminate or at least weaken the 
institutionalised inequalities that 25 years of universal franchise had failed to dislodge. 
                                                          
18 See Ghosh and Tawa Lama-Rewal (2005). 
19 The social scientists who undertook studies on the Committee’s request came back with a uniform 
finding that while women’s participation as voters had been increasing at a faster rate than men’s, their 
representation as candidates – successful or unsuccessful – registered an opposite trend  (CWDS 2000: 
19). 
20  Ibid. 
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They also saw the failures on the representational front as part and parcel of the secular 
trends of decline and marginalisation which they had identified on the grounds of 
economic, educational and health.   
More than a decade after the Towards Equality Report recommended 30 per cent 
reservation for women in elected bodies at the panchayat level, a national perspective 
plan for women issued by the government in 1988 under pressure from the women’s 
movement recommended 30 per cent reservation for women at all levels. The 
recommendation was incorporated as a demand by several political parties.  In 1992, 
the 73rd and 74th Amendment Acts provided constitutional recognition and status to 
local elected bodies in villages (the panchayats) and cities (the municipalities), 
respectively.   Apart from putting institutions of local governance in place, and 
decentralising power structures, the amendments also sought to deepen democracy by 
ensuring that hitherto excluded social groups like women, Scheduled Castes (SC) and 
Scheduled Tribes (ST) were adequately represented in these bodies. The Amendments 
therefore provided reservations for all these social groups, with the condition that no 
less than a third of the seats (including those reserved for women belonging to the SC 
and the ST communities) be reserved for women.21   
As the discussion in the next section will show, the representation of women in 
Parliament has been remarkably low over the last 14 general elections.  While there is a 
degree of consensus on women’s gross under-representation in Parliament, there is no 
political consensus on reservation for women.  Yet, during the 1990s a sharp 
polarisation of political opinions was witnessed around the Women’s Reservation Bill, 
which was first tabled in Parliament in 1996 by the Janata Dal led National Front 
coalition, and ‘was mired in conflict over the demand for special quotas for women of 
the other backward classes and minorities’.  Unlike certain countries in the West like 
Germany and the Nordic countries, where individual parties introduced party quotas 
which spread across parties through competition and the fear of punishment at the 
ballot box, reservation in India has been sought to be introduced not through party 
quotas but through the reservation of rotating single-member constituencies.22 It is 
                                                          
21 A great deal of work has been done on the panchayati raj institutions after the 73rd amendment, 
whereas research on the impact of the 74th Amendment and work on municipalities remains relatively 
frugal.  A 1998 study by the Centre for Women’s Development Studies has put together a bibliography of 
women and the Panchayati Raj.  Among other works on women’s participation in panchayats are Hust 
(2004), Mohanty (1995) and Rai et.al. (2006).  A significant work on women and local politics in urban 
areas are Ghosh and Lama-Rewal (2005).  
22 See Hust (2004: 30-31).  In Chapter six of her book, Hust argues that such a system of reservation is 
unique in political history, and leads to specific problems that are not so salient when the quota is 
operating through a party system.  The Bill provides for reservation by rotation: every third constituency 
could be reserved for women, chosen by lottery and rotated after a parliamentary period of five years.  
Several features of this Bill were found objectionable by feminists and others for its implications for 
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significant that much of the opposition to the Bill has come from the backward-caste 
communities, which have been making significant inroads in elected bodies and fear 
that reservation for women would eventually lead to the erosion of their gains by 
middle and upper-class women.23   
Notwithstanding the differences in opinion, enhancing women’s representation 
in the Parliament and other political/elected bodies through reservation has continued 
to be a significant part of the women’s movement’s agenda.24  While there is still an 
absence of consensus among women’s groups over whether reservation is the best 
strategy for increasing women’s participation, some scholars and women’s 
organisations do feel that the entry of women in the electoral process will help curb 
violence and corruption - in other words, that the female presence will moralise the 
system.25 Thus the late Gita Mukherjee, a CPI member and six-time MP from West 
Bengal who headed the special Parliamentary Committee on the Women’s Reservation 
Bill, repeatedly asserted that the first step was to allow women to break into politics, 
after which their awareness would automatically increase.  The Panchayati Raj 
institutions were seen as nurseries for the political training of women.  Poverty and 
violence, it was argued, could be fought against effectively if women formed a critical 
mass in all decision making bodies. The Forum for Democratic Reform, an umbrella 
organisation of women’s groups, proposed an alternative Bill that would make it legally 
binding for political parties to present women as one-third of their total candidates and 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
feminist politics, and for the political system as a whole.  Rotation reservation of constituencies, it was 
argued, would in effect mean ‘reserving’ the remaining two-third constituencies for men and pit women 
solely against women.  The political system, too, would experience uncertainty, since the system of 
rotation through a lottery every five years would mean constant switching and change of representatives.  
Both these factors would not only make their credibility in terms of their capacity to win rather suspect, 
and, on the other hand, make the relationship between the representative and her constituency tenuous.  
See Omvedt (2005: 4750)  
23 Parties like the Samajwadi Party, the Rashtriya Janata Dal, the Bahujan Samaj Party, the Indian Muslim 
League and the National Conference have opposed the Bill.  The combined votes of these parties, 
however, may not be enough to defeat the Bill if it is tabled in Parliament and supported by parties that 
have so far been publicly in favour of the Bill, viz., CPI(M), Congress(I), and BJP.  The fact that the latter 
have also been emphasising the need for a consensus, rather than pushing the Bill through on the floor of 
the House indicates that there may not be enough effort at facilitating the passage of the Bill through 
parliamentary discussion and debate. See Ghosh and Lama-Rewal (2005: 14).   
24 For the intricacies of the debates surrounding the issue in the women’s movement, see John (2000) and 
Menon (2000).   
25 The autonomous women’s organisations fear that women may not be able to further the broader interests 
of women amidst corrupt electoral process and practices, and may be compelled to make compromises in 
their principles, programmes and practices, and get sucked or co-opted into the system.  Moreover, it may 
also result in a situation where women from the elite sections, mainly the kith and kin of male politicians 
who are actually opposed to the women’s movement and progressive principles of any kind may get elected 
in large numbers (the biwi-beti brigade). 
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give proportionate tickets to those from Dalit and Backward Classes. Gita Mukherji’s 
associate Bidya Munshi criticised this position stating that women were likely to be 
relegated to seats where a particular political party was unlikely to win. While the 
government sought to alleviate the contest over ‘reservation within reservation’ by 
suggesting that the seats in Lok Sabha be increased to 725, the move was largely 
rejected for being ‘cumbersome’, and the demand for the original bill to be tabled was 
reiterated.   The commencement of the monsoon session in 2006, and the months 
immediately preceding it, saw the demand for reservation being pushed by women’s 
organisations with renewed vigour.  While the government failed to table the Bill in the 
monsoon session, the Winter session of the Parliament opened amidst fervent 
campaigns by women’s organisations and an announcement by the government that 
the Bill will be introduced in the ongoing session.       
 
The Missing Women? Exploring the gender gap in politics in India  
 
The presence of women in the Parliament in India, as Table 1 shows, has remained 
remarkably low and stable, ranging from an average of 5 per cent till the 1990s, when it 
increased to an average of 8 per cent.  In 1999 with 8.8 per cent women, the highest so 
far, India was 82nd of the 180 countries, for which data on women in the lower house 
was reported by the Inter-Parliamentary Union. In 2004, of the 498 elected 
representatives in the Lok Sabha, only 8.26 per cent or 45 were women. The caste-class 
composition of women members of Parliament, moreover, shows that class forms an 
important factor in the successful inclusion of women into the political system in 
decision-making positions.26  
                                                          
26 Shirin Rai’s study on class, caste and gender in the Indian Parliament makes some interesting 
observations. Caste has been an important factor insofar as most of the women MPs in the Tenth 
Parliament were members of the higher castes.  There were six women who were Brahmins, constituting 
thereby 17.14 per cent of the women MPs, though the Brahmins comprise only 5.52 per cent of the 
population.  Of the six, two women MPs from the CPI, were privileged in terms of class, and had a 
history of participation in political movements, the nationalist struggles and the anti-emergency 
movement.  The number of women who are able to avail of the caste-based reservation system in the 
Parliament is small.  While 22 per cent of the parliamentary seats are reserved for the Scheduled Castes, 
women occupy only 4.1 per cent of the reserved seats.  Two women MPs were from the Scheduled Tribes.  
Out of the 39 women MPs in the Tenth Lok Sabha (representing 7 per cent of the total strength), 14 per 
cent were from the Scheduled Castes.  Two women MPs belonged to the backward castes, and 
represented open constituencies.  Class and social position were, however, equally significant.  Out of the 
39 women MPs in the 1991- 96 Lok Sabha, 32 had post-graduate qualifications.  In the Rajya Sabha 14 out 
of 17 women MPs were graduates.  The class position of these women, points out Rai, was obviously 
more important to their educational levels than caste.  Only one out of the seven lower-caste women MPs 
was not a graduate and the one Scheduled Caste woman MP in the Rajya Sabha was a postgraduate.  The 
levels of education (and, therefore, the class position) is also reflected in the professional profiles of these 
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While women from all communities are under-represented, Muslim women’s 
representation has remained especially low.  As the table below shows, of the 14 Lok 
Sabha elections so far, a total of only 16 women from the Muslim community have been 
elected to the Lok Sabha, and in six elections, not even one Muslim woman was elected.  
On the other hand, the maximum number of Muslim women who could get elected has 
been three in the 1977 and 1984 elections respectively.   
 
Year of 
election 
No. of 
Women M.P’s 
No. of 
Muslim 
Women 
1952 23 0 
1957 24 2 
1962 37 2 
1967 32 0 
1971 26 0 
1977 18 3 
1980 32 2 
1984 45 3 
1989 28 0 
1991 40 0 
1996 40 1 
1998 44 0 
1999 47 1 
2004 45 2 
Source: Sanjay Kumar, ‘Muslim Women in India: Opinions, Attitudes and      Participation 
in Politics’  (unpublished paper) 
 
The smaller proportion of women in the Lok Sabha is replicated in the state 
legislative assemblies as well.  The number of women legislators remains low in almost 
every state.  Moreover, the proportion of women candidates in all major political parties 
remained around 10 per cent of the total candidates nominated by the party.  While 
political parties have evidently doubted their winning ability, election data shows that 
the success rates of men and women candidates do not differ in a major way.  By 
implication, it means that voters are not apprehensive of women candidates 
(Deshpande 2004: 5433).   
Following the continuum approach to politics, it may be proposed that 
democratic citizenship does not only entail frameworks of representation, which make 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
women.  Thirty per cent of women MPs in the Rajya Sabha were lawyers, and 25 per cent in the Lok 
Sabha were either teachers or lecturers.  See Shirin Rai (2002).        
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it necessary that we talk about a critical mass of numbers.  It rather involves, as 
discussed earlier in the paper, that people’s representatives, the voters, electoral 
processes, and actors through each electoral trial, are tied in a multilayered relationship 
that creates a democratic agora or dialogical spaces, marked by critical action and 
recognition of difference or agonism.  Thus when we talk about representation and the 
invisibility of women in political bodies, it is important that we also look at another 
aspect of participation – women voters – and thereafter at the manner in which an 
articulated public sphere bridges the temporal and spatial distance between 
representation and participation.   
 Both the Election Commission and the National Election Survey data show that 
women have consistently turned out to vote less than men, although the gender gap or 
the turnout differential between men and women has decreased over the years, 
steadying at 8 per cent through the elections of 1998, 1999 and 2004 (Tables 1, 2, 3 and 4; 
Figures 1 to 3). In an interesting analogy, Sudhir Varma, the Chief Election Officer in the 
Government of Rajasthan at the time of doing his study, extended the category ‘missing 
women’, normally used in the context of the declining sex ratio, to women absent from 
the electoral rolls (1997: 79-124). Varma correctly points out that since the trend of 
decline in the sex ratio in India has been primarily in the 0-18 age group, which is the 
non-voting population, and the sex ratio of the voting population is better than the 
general sex ratio, the electoral sex ratio under ideal conditions should reflect this.  Yet, 
the electoral sex ratio (ESR) is actually adverse.  In the 1991 Lok Sabha elections, for 
example out of a total of 49.8 crore voters only 23.6 crore were women, which meant 
that nearly a crore women voters were left out of the voters list.  While the pattern of 
ESR is complex, a pattern of absences may be identified in terms of differences across 
states, between rural and urban constituencies, between general and reserved 
constituencies, as well as among reserved constituencies across states.27        
Election data shows that there is no correlation between women’s turn-out and 
the number of women elected as representatives.  As evident from Table 3 showing 
male and female voter percentage, the year 1998 showed the highest female poll 
percentage in the 1990s at 57.69 per cent, coming close to the two highs in the 1980s 
(58.59 per cent in 1984 and 57.31 per cent in 1989).  In the corresponding years the 
percentage of women representatives in the Lok Sabha was 7.9 per cent in 1984 which 
was an increase from 5.1 per cent in 1980.  In 1980, however, the percentage dropped at 
5.3 per cent, to rise again to 7.9 per cent in 1991.  For the 1990s high the corresponding 
percentage of women representatives was 7.9 percent, almost one percentage point 
                                                          
27 Sudhir Varma’s study (1997) makes interesting comparisons and also goes into the reasons for women’s 
absence from the electoral rolls and their lack of access to the ballot box, even when their names figure in 
the list.    
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lower than the highest achieved in the subsequent year at 8.8 per cent.  In the same year, 
however, the female poll percentage dropped from the 57.69 per cent of 1998 to 55.63 
per cent.   
As evident from Table 2 and Figures 1 and 3, there is an overall increase in the 
size of the electorate and in the numbers of women and men voters over the years, 
alongside a consistent gender gap.  Despite the gender gap, one can identify ‘a definite 
participatory upsurge’ among Indian women in the 1990s (Deshpande 2004, Yadav 
2000), seen both in terms of an increase in the proportion of women voters among the 
total voters, and their turnout (Tables 2, 3 and 4; Figures 1, 2 and 3).  While as 
mentioned earlier, 1984 remained the peak for women voter percentage, in 1998 the 
female poll percentage reached close to the landmark of 1984 and 1989.  Unlike the peak 
in the 1980s where the increase was associated with the fortunes of the Indian National 
Congress in the phase of transition with the demise of Indira Gandhi, the increase in the 
1990s has been explained on two counts, both of which, however, demand empirical 
evidence. 
The increase may possibly be associated with the ‘second democratic upsurge’, 
as Yogendra Yadav termed the phenomenon, referring to the process of 
democratisation in the decade of the 1990s, especially the dynamism which the electoral 
process witnessed in the period, characterised by a hitherto unprecedented upsurge in 
political participation by the lower classes of the Indian electorate.28 It is significant that 
the second democratic upsurge is also put forward by Yadav as a counterpoint to 
proceduralism and ‘design fallacy’, focusing attention on the processes whereby the 
democratic will of the people is able to make itself effectively manifest, irrespective of 
electoral design.  Apart from the upsurge among the backward classes, the increase in 
women voters may just as well be attributed to the Panchayati Raj reforms, which 
boosted participation among women.  While the increase may in all probability have 
been associated with the democratic upsurge and churning which the panchayat 
elections brought in their wake, the relationship cannot be conclusively established 
unless the caste-gender data for the period is examined.  Moreover, the two may not be 
seen as exclusive and the political upsurge among the backward classes may be seen as 
simultaneous and intertwined.  The turnout of women voters as a proportion of the 
total voters by States in the Lok Sabha elections for 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2004 
                                                          
28 The second democratic upsurge, the first being the phase of the 1960s, is the term given by Yogendra 
Yadav to refer to the ‘new phase of democratic politics’ in India in the 1990s, particularly in the State 
Assembly elections during the period 1993-95, characterised by a hitherto unprecedented upsurge in 
political participation, particularly by the lower classes of the Indian electorate.  An average of more than 
64 per cent in these elections indicated a decisive break in this period from the previous period of 
Assembly elections, and a sizeable 9 per cent increase over the Lok Sabha elections (Yadav 1999 and 
2004).    
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shows that in certain states like Bihar, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Uttar 
Pradesh, there was a jump in the proportion of women among the total voters from 
previous election years.  In the case of Bihar, the numbers leapt from 39.8 per cent in 
1996 to 47 per cent in 1998.  In Gujarat, the increase was incremental, increasing from 
40.1 per cent in 1996 to 45.2 per cent in 1998, climbing yet again to 48.4 per cent in 1999.  
In Madhya Pradesh the proportion of women voters increased from 42 per cent in 1996 
to 48.1 per cent in 1998, and stabilised thereon.   Like Gujarat, in Rajasthan the number 
increased incrementally, from 40 per cent in 1996 to 43.4 per cent in 1998, to 47.3 per 
cent in 1999 and 47.7 per cent in 2004.   
Seen in terms of a gender gap or differential voter turn-out in men and women, 
the picture in more complex.  In her study based on NES data, Rajeshwari Deshpande 
points out that after the 1998 elections, which witnessed a significant rupture in 
women’s political participation, there occurred a plateau, which when unraveled would 
show that whereas for most states the gender gap in turn-out remained at 5 per cent, it 
widened in states like Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, Jharkhand and 
Gujarat. The latter were the same states that had witnessed a significant rise in the 
number of women voters in the 1998 elections.  If the gender gap in turnout in these 
states in the recent elections is explained vis-à-vis their social backwardness, the rise of 
women voters earlier may then be linked to the overall increase in the participation of 
marginalised groups in the 1990s.   
The NES Lok Sabha post poll data for the years 1999 and 2004 for Uttar Pradesh 
and Bihar (Tables 5 to 8) shows an interesting pattern.29  What is interesting about these 
figures is that they afford a comparison among communities on the basis of the 
proportion of women who voted in each community. The comparison is interesting 
                                                          
29 The National Election Study (NES) is a nation-wide study conducted across more than 2000 locations in 
India by the Centre for the Study of Democratic Societies (CSDS).  NES 2004, for example, was conducted 
at 2380 locations spread across all 29 states of India. The study is based on a three-stage stratified random 
sample, where the Parliamentary constituencies and Assembly segments are randomly drawn using the 
Probability Proportionate to Size (PPS) method, and the polling stations (locations) are randomly 
sampled using the simple random method. In the 2004 study 35,360 respondents were randomly selected 
from the electoral rolls of the selected polling booths. The respondents were contacted for interview at 
their homes, using a structured questionnaire.  Of the total respondents selected, 27,189 could be 
successfully contacted and interviewed. With minor variations, the sample was truly representative, with 
79.8 per cent Hindus, 11.3 per cent Muslims, 17.9 per cent Dalits and 9 per cent Adivasis. The sample had 
46.5 per cent women respondents and 53.5 per cent male respondents. The sample over-represented 
people from rural areas. Compared to the fact that India is 72.2 per cent rural, the sample had 78.6 per 
cent respondents from rural areas. Naturally the sample under-represented the urban respondents by 
nearly 6 per cent.  The study was conducted after the 2004 Lok Sabha elections. The fieldwork of the 
survey was done with the help of nearly 1,200 field investigators after the polling was over, but was 
completed before the counting of votes. The description of the survey is taken from Sanjay Kumar, who is 
the national coordinator of NES. 
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despite the fact that a lesser percentage of upper-caste women voting may work out to 
be more in absolute numbers.  In 1999 more men irrespective of caste and community 
consistently claimed to have voted e.g., 86 per cent of Muslim men said they voted as 
did 67.8 per cent of upper-caste men, and 80 per cent of others.  On the other hand 
while more Muslim and SC women voted (both at 57.7 per cent) and 52.5 per cent of 
upper- caste women and 69 per cent of other women voted, in all categories the number 
of women who voted was significantly less than the men in the same category (Table 5).  
In 2004, however (Table 6), the picture changes somewhat with the percentage of upper- 
castes (Brahmin and Rajput) and Muslim men who said they voted showing a decline 
from 1999.  The decline is also seen in all categories among women including the upper 
castes and Muslims.   The picture in Bihar for the 1999 elections also shows a consistent 
high voting percentage for men in all caste/tribe categories averaging in the eighties, 
except the Scheduled Tribes. The percentage of women voting remained considerably 
less, with the proportion of Muslim women (56.7 per cent) who claimed to have voted 
again surpassing women from all other categories (Table 7).  Remarkably, in the 2004 
polls, the percentage of upper-caste women who voted declines, as the percentage of 
Yadav women claiming that they voted increases dramatically from 46.2 per cent to 61.8 
per cent and the percentage of Muslim women declines from 56.7 per cent to 50.6 per 
cent (Table 8).  The stabilisation of the turnout of women voters from 1996 and 1998 to 
1999 and 2004 thus shows internal and regional differentiation.     
 
Discussion 
 
Contemporary frameworks of gendering electoral governance - comprising of initiatives 
by the United Nations, the NGOs, the women’s movement, and feminist theorists - may 
broadly be described as frameworks of differentiated universalism.  In other words, these 
frameworks adhere to a principle of inclusion that starts from the premise that the 
universal principles of electoral governance may not reflect the special needs that 
emerge from women’s societal contexts and the specific structural constraints that 
women suffer.  The right to vote and to be represented may then exist in law, but can be 
denied in practice to women. Women, moreover, may feel overwhelmingly about 
women’s issues, especially on the question of reservation of seats for women in the Lok 
Sabha and Legislative Assemblies, and issues of right to higher education, to work and 
political participation, cultural constraints to public contact between women and men, 
and the manner in which the public space remains debilitating for women may place 
limits on their mobility   Rajeshwari Deshpande’s study based on NES data shows that 
while there appears a consensus among women on women’s issues, including 
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reservations in elected bodies and women’s right to work, which cuts across social 
groups and communities, there is little to indicate that this consensus translates itself 
into concerted political action.  On another set of questions relating to economic issues, 
women across social sections, along with men, share common grounds.  On a set of 
social issues relating to inter-caste and inter-community relationships, however, women 
seem to cling to community ties more than men, favouring closed inter-community 
relationships (Deshpande 2004). Often, however, the electoral system and the 
management of the system may inhibit women’s participation. Sudhir Varma’s study 
shows that the exclusion of women from the electoral list and their lack of access to the 
ballot box produce low electoral sex ratio and gender gap in voting, respectively.  Often, 
moreover, the increase in the number of women voters in the electoral rolls, as in 1996, 
is deceptive since the electoral sex ratio may continue to be worse than the sex ratio.  In 
1991 in particular, the electoral sex ratio fell from 938 in 1981, to 886.  The fall could 
have been due to the fact that between 1981 and 1991, the voting age was lowered to 18, 
and a number of 18-year-old girls may have been left out of the voter list.  Moreover, 
different groups seem to be showing different patterns of ESR.  Thus in 1991, in certain 
states like Haryana, Himachal Pradesh, Karnataka, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa and 
Rajasthan, constituencies reserved for SCs have a substantially lower ESR than the ESR 
of the state.  For general constituencies also, in some states the ESR was worse than the 
ESR for the state (Varma 1997: 84-86). 
The continuum model, as discussed earlier, seeks to bring together 
differentiation with universalism through the creation of a talking and doing space that 
bridges the hiatus between voting and decision-making, which are performed by 
different sets of people and different moments.  It is therefore this space that needs to be 
strengthened for all differentially included groups.  In the case of women in particular, 
bringing up women’s issues as significant in the electoral agenda of political parties and 
the public space is important.  Again, continuous dissemination of information on poll 
issues and candidates as well as programmes is important, since women too need to 
know in order to perform the act of voting well.  While groups like Lok Satta,30 
Association for Democratic Reform,31 Lok Raj Sangathan,32 and Lok Samvad of Bihar, 
                                                          
30 A Hyderabad-based organisation which describes itself as a ‘people’s movement for better governance’.  
While its organisational activities are confined to Andhra Pradesh, its goals are, it argues, national.  It 
describes its work as being dedicated to good governance, fighting against corruption and the illegal use 
of money power in elections.    
31 The Association for Democratic Reforms is an Ahmedabad-based non-political, non-partisan group of 
professors of the Indian Institute of Management Ahmedabad (IIMA), the National Institute of Design 
(NID) and alumni of IIMA, working on ‘improving governance’ and ‘strengthening democracy in India’.  
A Public Interest Litigation (PIL) filed by ADR in December 1999 culminated in a landmark Supreme 
Court Judgement on 2 May 2002, emphasising the right to know of the citizen voter, and an ordinance on 
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which is a network of organisations working on electoral reforms and Right to 
Information, have taken the lead in suggesting reforms for the electoral system, 
women’s groups like Sakhi33 in Kerala and Vimochana34 in Karnataka have over the 
years campaigned to inform women about their candidates.  
 
The following is the text of a leaflet which was published by Vimochana, for the 1989 elections, urging 
women voters to vote against candidates charged with crimes against women: 
 
To All Women Voters 
 
Vimochana is not a political party.  Why then do we reach out to you at the time of general elections? 
In 1979 when we first intervened in the political process, we did so to raise women’s issues and put 
them on the political agenda.  We had asked you then to vote for candidates who would recognise and 
talk about violence against women – dowry, rape, sexual harassment, exploitation in the media, 
shelter, fuel, water … questions on which politicians are totally silent.  
We have come some way since then.  Women’s issues have become more ‘visible’.  We are now an 
essential part of political rhetoric – no speech or manifesto is complete without a formula to draw 
women into the political and national mainstream.  Why then do we need to reach out to you once 
again? 
 
Perhaps because we all know that in an age of false promises and hollow utopias, this rhetoric too 
hides the everyday reality of a majority of the women in India.  We write to you this time to ask you to 
expose the hypocrisy behind political promises.  All parties speak glibly about giving full 
representation of women in politics – some have gone so far as to promise 30% reservation in these 
elections.  How many parties have fulfilled this promise?  In fact this year the number of women 
candidates has drastically decreased. 
We ask you [to] expose this hypocrisy because we all know that most of our ‘representatives’ rarely 
practice at home what they preach on the streets – they cleverly separate private ethics from public 
morality.  Today wife beaters and rapists can talk of equality of women; mafia dons can talk of justice; 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
electoral reforms promulgated in August 2002. The Ordinance was subsequently passed as a Bill in 
December 2002. It partially overturned the 2 May 2002 Supreme Court Judgement requiring disclosure of 
a criminal background, but not of financial and educational backgrounds. ADR and two other petitioners 
challenged this Act. In a second landmark judgement on 13 March 2003, the Supreme Court struck down 
the Bill as unconstitutional and restored its earlier order.  Subsequently, the Election Commission issued 
orders implementing the judgment, requiring candidates to fill in an affidavit giving personal details 
including financial.  
32 Lok Raj Sangathan is an all-India organisation set up in May 1998.  It describes itself as a ‘political 
organization of a new type whose mission is to vest sovereignty in the hands of the people’.  It argues 
that the political process is being dominated by a handful of so-called recognized political parties, which 
are trained for the status quo and aims among other things to expand the people’s role in the political 
process.  
33 Started in 1996, Sakhi, which literally means a woman friend, is a feminist documentation, training and 
resource centre.  It describes itself as  ‘a space for women to come together, share their pains, anxieties, 
pleasures and fun’.  In the recent state election in Kerala (April-May 2006) Sakhi campaigned against a 
candidate who was charged with molestation. 
34 Vimochana is a Bangalore-based women’s organisation which has led a concerted campaign against 
torture and violence against women, in particular domestic violence.    
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fundamentalists can preach secularism …. As women and 50% of the electorate we have to exercise out 
vote to transform this degenerate political culture.  Let us all take a strong stand against ‘leaders’ like: 
 Z.R. Ansari, the Union Minister of State for forestation, who despite being directly implicated in 
an attempt to rape charge by Mukti Datta, a woman activist working in Himachal Pradesh, has 
been given a Lok Sabha ticket. 
 Kalvi, a Janata Dal leader from Rajasthan who openly came out in support of the murder of Roop 
Kanwar, a young widow burnt alive on her husband’s pyre in 1988. 
 The 19 CPI(M) activists arrested in connection with the gang rape of a young woman activist of 
Kashtakari Sangathan, an organisation working with the tribals in Dahanu District, Maharashtra. 
 Suraj Singh Deo, Bihar’s Mafia king, who is the trusted Lieutenant of Chandrashekhar, senior 
leader of the Janata Dal. 
 H.K.L. Bhagat, who has been directly named by a number of the post-Indira Gandhi murder riot 
victims in Delhi in 1984 as the man behind the mass kilings of Sikhs and yet continues to be a 
Union Minister and a senior Congress (I) leader. 
 R.L. Jalappa, a Janata Dal candidate from Doddaballapur, who has been implicated in the murder 
of a lawyer. 
 Dr. Venkatesh, a former Janata Party M.P., at present contesting on a Congress (I) ticket from 
Bethmangala to the Karnataka Assembly, who has not only deserted his wife and child without 
paying any maintenance despite court order, but also has a criminal case of assault on his wife 
pending against him. 
 
The list is endless …. 
The irony is that none of the political parties involved i.e., the CPI(M), Janata, or the Congress (I) have 
thought fit to initiate any enquiry against these individuals who have all been implicated in serious 
crimes.  The greater irony is that some of these are not even seen as crimes – deserting a wife is seen as 
a ‘personal’ domestic issue.  Society too sanctions such acts with its silence and cynicism about the 
‘criminalisation of politics’. 
--- Boycott these candidates in your constituency who get up on a public platform and speak of 
equality for women while denigrating and violating them in their personal lives. 
---- Support those candidates who you are assured will respond positively to issues of violence against 
women. 
---- Support those candidates who genuinely attempt into put to practice what they speak, both in their 
public and in their private lives. 
It is a small step but the first one. 
 
Let us vote with our conscience and bring conscience back into politics. 
 
November 1989 
Vimochana 
Forum for Women’s Rights 
P.O.Box 4605. 
 
Several women’s groups have prepared women’s manifestos, undertaken ‘know thy 
candidate’ campaigns and issued leaflets highlighting women’s issues.  They have also, 
over the years, campaigned against candidates with a criminal background or a past 
record of violence against women.  Vimochana, for example, campaigned against such 
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candidates by distributing leaflets35, organising street-corner meetings, and writing in 
newspapers.  Feminist organisations demanded ‘a code of conduct’ for party cadres in 
the context of complaints of sexual violence against CPI(M) party cadres in Kerala and 
Bengal.  In Maharashtra, the Stree Mukti Sampark Samiti (Women’s Liberation 
Coordination Committee), a state-level United Front of the progressive and left 
women’s organisations, issued a leaflet before the Lok Sabha Elections in February 1990 
putting forth a perspective of women’s organisations of elections, and suggesting to 
voters the principles and programmes which should determine their choice of 
candidates.  The issues that were highlighted in the leaflet as significant for women 
pertained to fundamentalism, family laws, and issues of development and ecology, 
identifying women’s concerns that needed to be addressed, viz., fuel-fodder-water 
issues, electrification, dams, education, health, employment, violence against women, 
media’s depiction of women, and rural and tribal women’s struggles for survival.  The 
leaflet also suggested that candidates should be accountable to their constituencies on 
these issues (Patel 2005: 43-44).       
Kerala Streevedi, an autonomous network of women’s groups in Kerala, 
including Sakhi, carried out campaigns against candidates accused or convicted in 
sexual violence cases in the Assembly election of 2006.  The network campaigned 
against Neela Lohita Dasan Nadar, contesting from the Kovalam constituency, who 
originally belonged to the Janata Dal (U) and was part of the LDF.  Nadar was 
convicted in two cases of sexual harassment at the workplace, and as a result of the 
campaign the LDF withdrew his candidature, after which he stood as an independent 
candidate.  A similar campaign was waged against Kunjalikutty, a former minister who 
was commonly believed to have been involved in a case of sexual harassment, though 
his name was not among the accused, in Kuttipuram from where he contested.  
The need to strengthen and continually recreate a vibrant political space and 
thereby bridge the gender gap both in voting and decision-making remains.  While 
specific states have had experience of women participating in the political process at the 
local level even before the 73rd and 74th amendments,36 since the 1990s a concerted effort 
by women’s organisations to appeal to women voters at the national level has also 
                                                          
35 See Box 
36 Maharashtra for example, has several experiences of women participating in the mainstream political 
processes.  There were cases of two villages putting up an all-women panel for Panchayat elections and 
losing.  There have also been cases of all-women panchayats getting elected and functioning in Pune 
district in the early eighties.  The experiences of the Samgara Mahila Agadhi (All Women’s Front), a 
broad platform created by the Shetkari Sangathan Mahila Agadhi in Maharashtra in putting up nine all-
women panels for Gram Panchayat elections in 1989 have received great visibility in the women’s 
movement.  The facilitation of women to contest for elections in local self-government by Samagra Mahila 
Agadhi comes in the midst of struggles of peasant women in parts of Maharashtra. 
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emerged. Women’s groups, as discussed, have put up manifestos, conducted 
educational campaigns, and put up codes of conduct for party candidates and cadres. In 
the 1990s the Forum of National Women’s Organisations based in Delhi had appealed 
to women to vote judiciously, and articulated their intention to directly intervene in the 
electoral processes.37 A perspective that has gained some clarity within a wide range of 
organisations is the relevance of influencing the decisions of those in power, and 
placing gender issues on the political agenda.  Women’s groups in different states in 
India have also experimented with networks to promote ideas and consolidate issues on 
a common platform.38 An interesting development has been the setting up of the 
Womanist Party of India (WPI) or the Bhartiya Streevadi Paksha in 2003 which claims to 
have a constructive approach in politics to bring equal representation for women in 
Parliament through 50 per cent reservation and pursuing a development agenda that 
recognises and affirms women’s rights over natural resources – land, water, fuel-wood, 
etc.39   
To understand the efforts by non-party associations and women’s organisations 
to consolidate a common platform for electoral reforms one needs to return to the point 
where the paper began, i.e., the imperative to bridge the temporal, spatial and 
ideological hiatus - between ‘electoral trials’, representatives and the people, and the act 
of voting and decision-making.  Such a notion of active citizenship differs from 
frameworks that explain this activity within the framework of ‘crisis of representation’ 
thesis, which proposes that when citizens perceive the traditional forms of 
representation such as ‘political parties and trade unions’ to be inadequate, or face 
                                                          
37 Newsletter, Vol. 12, No. 2, Research Centre for Women’s Studies, 1991, Bombay.   
38 While some of these networks have grown organically from within the women’s movement, reacting to 
certain issues and events, the growth of others have been facilitated by funding agencies and kept alive 
with a certain agenda.  Paradoxically, most networks have not synergised to keep networking efforts 
alive on a sustainable basis.  By and large several networks seem to come alive to react to specific issues 
and relapse into inaction till another issue, sufficiently proactive, propels them into action.  Classification 
of networks reveals certain trends.  Large organisations such as AIDWA, Mahila Dakshta Samithi, All 
India Coordination Committee for Working Women and, Joint Women’s Programme (JWP) have 
branches in different parts of the country with networking arrangements.  The emergence of the two 
informal national fora – Forum for Women and Politics (FWP) and the Forum of National Women’s 
Organisation (FNWO) - in the 1990s is noteworthy in that they reflect a trend to come together for joint 
action despite differences in ideology and organisational perspectives.  The FNWO comprises of AIDWA, 
CWDS, AIWC, JWF, MDS, NFIW and YWCA.  Each of these organisations has promoted lateral 
networks, making efforts to bring their members together through regular visits, workshops, conventions 
and campaigns. The Forum for Women and Politics comprising of autonomous women’s groups such as 
Jagori, Saheli, JWP, Ankur, Action India, Sabla Sangh, Shaktishalini, Kali for Women and Purogami 
Mahila Sangathan have a common past in that they have been coming together for several joint 
campaigns (Ramaswamy 1997: 191-92).  
39 The details of the document laying out the position of the WPI - ‘Let us Make a History’ - in Marathi is 
available in Patel (2005: 49).     
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recalcitrant and unresponsive political institutions as in the case of the countries of 
Eastern and Central Europe in the 1980s, they ‘turn their back on the political domain 
and form self-help organisations in civil society to solve their problems’.40 The shift to 
organisations in civil society has taken place, the thesis argues, since traditional modes 
of representation such as political parties have exhausted their capacity to represent the 
aspirations of their constituencies, have become hierarchical, bureaucratic and rigid, 
have followed the political logic and impulse of power-seeking more assiduously than 
pursuing the task of representing the needs and interests of their constituents, and have, 
unlike civil society organisations, been out of touch with the exigencies of everyday life, 
in particular at the local levels. Examining the crisis of representation thesis in the 
Indian context through a survey conducted in Delhi in 2003, however, Neera 
Chandhoke argues that the findings showed that there existed among respondents an 
excessive reliance on personalised contacts to resolve problems.  While the latter 
pointed to the fact that neither political parties nor civil society organisations inspire 
confidence in the minds of the citizens, it also showed the ways in which the 
‘profoundly undemocratic’ consolidation of patron-client relationships takes place, 
isolating people and ‘pre-empting the forging of solidarity on crucial issues that are 
common to all, in civil society’.41  The lessons that one can draw from the study while 
building a case for a continuum approach, whereby a continual and concerted multi-
layered activity creates an agora of democratic politics, is looking at the ways that block 
the consolidation of such trends. 
We must at this point, emphasise yet again, the importance of 
revitalising/democratising the public sphere through communication, speech and 
action, which are empowering and conducive to building alliances for a shared 
common perspective, and work towards democratising participatory institutions by 
focusing our energies both for information about them and for purging them.  
Strengthening political and representative institutions will also be conducive to rolling 
back the influence that participatory networks forged through non-governmental 
organisations have come to assume as being of value by itself.  As mentioned at the 
outset, such an approach may ultimately edge out the people as dominant groups take 
over the mediating and negotiating spaces, generating thereby greater powerlessness 
and exclusion.  The notion of the public as a democratically negotiated, and therefore, 
an inclusive collective interest, may be effaced in such a situation, increasing the 
vulnerability of groups that already have a differential access to the public.  It is 
important, therefore, and it is significant that the efforts at reforms attempted by some 
                                                          
40 The thesis is discussed and found wanting by Neera Chadhoke in her article ‘Revisiting the Crisis of 
Representation Thesis: The Indian Context’, Democratisation (forthcoming). 
41 Ibid. 
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of the groups mentioned above have addressed themselves to the voters, creating 
thereby the space where the ‘talking and doing’ will translate into critical action having 
a significant bearing on the nature of representation.    
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Appendix 
 
Table 1 
 
Turnout differential and the percentage of women in the Lok Sabha 
Year Turnout differential 
between men and 
women 
% of women in Lok Sabha 
1952  4.4 
1957  5.4 
1962 17 6.7 
1967 11 5.9 
1971 21 4.2 
1977 11 3.4 
1980 9.5 5.1 
1984 10 7.9 
1989 9 5.3 
1991 10 7.9 
1996 9 7.3 
1998 8 7.9 
1999 8 8.8 
2004 8 8.26 
Source: Election Commission of India 
Note: Data available at the Election Commission of India website -  http://www.eci.gov.in 
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Table 2 
 
 Male and Female Voters 
 
Total No. of 
Electors 
Year 
    
173212343 1951 Male Female Voters 
193652179 1957 Male Female Year 
127719470 1962 67388166 60331304 1962 
248904300 1967 129568604 119335696 1967 
274189132 1971 143564829 130624303 1971 
321174327 1977 167019151 154155176 1977 
356205329 1980 185539439 170665890 1980 
379540608 1984 196730499 182810109 1984 
498906129 1989 262045142 236860987 1989 
498363801 1991 261832499 236531302 1991 
592572288 1996 309815776 282756512 1996 
605880192 1998 316692789 289187403 1998 
619536847 1999 323813667 295723180 1999 
671487930 2004 349490864 321997066 2004 
Source: Election Commission website 
Note: Tables 3 and 4 and Figures 1 to 4 are available at the Election Commission’s website – 
http://www.eci.gov.in 
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Table 3 
 
  Male and Female Voter Percentages 
 
Poll 
Percentage 
Year 
     
44.87 1951  Male Female Poll Percentage 
45.44 1957 Total Male Female Year 
55.42 1962 55.27 60.8 49.11 1971 
61.04 1967 60.49 65.62 54.91 1977 
55.27 1971 56.92 62.17 51.2 1980 
60.49 1977 63.56 68.17 58.59 1984 
56.92 1980 61.95 66.13 57.31 1989 
63.56 1984 56.73 61.58 51.34 1991 
61.95 1989 57.94 62.06 53.41 1996 
56.73 1991 61.97 65.86 57.69 1998 
57.94 1996 59.94 63.96 55.63 1999 
61.97 1998 58.07 61.98 53.63 2004 
59.94 1999     
58.07 2004     
Source: Election Commission website http://www.eci.gov.in 
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Table 4 
Women Voters as a Proportion of Total Voters by States, Lok Sabha Elections  
(per cent) 
State 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 
Andhra Pradesh 46.1 47.3 50.7 50.1 50.4 
Arunachal Pradesh 43.1 44.8 46.2 47.5 48.6 
Assam 44.3 45.8 46.4 47.8 47.9 
Bihar 38.2 39.8 47.0 46.9 46.4 
Goa 45.4 46.3 47.8 49.1 49.4 
Gujarat 40.9 40.1 45.2 48.4 48.5 
Haryana 43.6 45.0 43.4 45.5 45.9 
Himachal Pradesh 46.1 48.4 49.9 49.4 49.0 
Jammu and Kashmir - 37.2 38.4 45.8 45.5 
Karnataka 43.8 45.4 46.3 49.1 49.1 
Kerala 50.5 50.9 51.4 51.0 51.8 
Madhya Pradesh 38.6 42.0 48.1 48.0 47.8 
Maharashtra 42.1 43.7 44.9 47.8 47.9 
Manipur 50.3 49.5 49.6 50.9 51.4 
Meghalaya 46.1 49.2 50.0 49.6 49.6 
Mizoram 48.1 50.4 49.9 49.8 50.2 
Nagaland 45.5 46.1 44.9 47.1 47.4 
Orissa 40.4 43.8 43.7 48.2 48.2 
Punjab 40.2 46.5 45.5 47.2 47.9 
Rajasthan 39.1 40.0 43.4 47.3 47.7 
Sikkim 39.1 45.5 44.6 48.8 48.3 
Tamil Nadu 47.6 48.1 47.0 49.6 50.7 
Tripura 44.7 47.8 48.0 48.2 48.2 
Uttar Pradesh 40.6 39.9 40.7 45.2 45.2 
West Bengal 44.9 46.3 46.2 47.8 47.7 
Chhattisgarh     46.5 
Jharkhand     48.1 
Uttaranchal     43.9 
Andaman and Nicobar 41.7 42.3 43.3 41.9 45.5 
Chandigarh 42.7 43.5 42.1 42.5 44.5 
Dadra & Nagar Haveli 48.1 48.8 48.8 47.4 46.9 
Daman and Diu 50.8 51.3 49.7 49.0 50.0 
Delhi 40.5 41.8 40.3 42.3 43.4 
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Lakshadweep 50.3 49.4 49.7 48.2 49.0 
Pondicherry 48.6 49.9 49.6 49.2 51.2 
All-India 42.9 44.0 46.9 47.7 48.0 
Source: Rajeshwari Deshpande (2004) (Table based on the data from the National Election Survey 
 2004)              
 
Table 5  
Uttar Pradesh Lok Sabha 1999 Post Poll 
Caste/Community/Gender  
Gender Did you vote  Total 
Men No Yes  
Upper caste 55 
32.2% 
23.8% 
116 
67.8% 
26.4% 
171 
100.0% 
25.5% 
Yadav 33 
50.0% 
14.3% 
33 
50.0% 
7.5% 
66 
100.0% 
9.9% 
OBC 88 
40.0% 
38.1% 
132 
60.0% 
30.1% 
220 
100.0% 
32.8% 
SC 44 
31.0% 
19.0% 
98 
69.0% 
22.3% 
142 
100.0% 
21.2% 
Muslims 7 
13.7% 
3.0% 
44 
86.3% 
10.0% 
51 
100.0% 
7.6% 
Others 4 
20.0% 
1.7% 
16 
80.0% 
3.6% 
20 
100.0% 
3.0% 
Total 231 
34.5% 
100.0% 
439 
65.5% 
100.0% 
670 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Women No Yes Total 
Upper caste 77 
47.5% 
23.9% 
85 
52.5% 
26.4% 
162 
100.0% 
25.2% 
 
 46 
Yadav 26 
53.1% 
8.1% 
23 
46.9% 
7.1% 
49 
100.0% 
7.6% 
OBC 146 
56.8% 
45.3% 
111 
43.2% 
34.5% 
257 
100.0% 
39.9% 
SC 47 
42.3% 
14.6% 
64 
57.7% 
19.9% 
111 
100.0% 
17.2% 
Muslims 22 
42.3% 
6.8% 
30 
57.7% 
9.3% 
52 
100.0% 
8.1% 
Others 4 
30.8% 
1.2% 
9 
69.2% 
2.8% 
13 
100.0% 
2.0% 
Total 322 
50.0% 
100.0% 
322 
50.0% 
100.0% 
644 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Source: CSDS data unit 
Table 6 
Uttar Pradesh Post Poll 2004 
Caste/Community/Gender 
Gender Were you able to vote  Total 
Men Unable to vote Able to vote  
Brahmin 60 
59.4% 
14.9% 
41 
40.6% 
8.6% 
101 
100.0% 
11.5% 
Rajput 17 
34.7% 
4.2% 
32 
65.3% 
6.7% 
49 
100.0% 
5.6% 
Vaishya 17 
51.5% 
4.2% 
16 
48.5% 
3.3% 
33 
100.0% 
3.7% 
Other Upper Caste  9 
100.0% 
1.9% 
9 
100.0% 
1.0% 
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Jat 9 
45% 
2.2% 
11 
55.0% 
2.3% 
20 
100.0% 
2.3% 
Yadav 46 
56.1% 
11.4% 
36 
43.9% 
7.5% 
82 
100.0% 
9.3% 
Oth Peasant OBC 46 
36.8% 
11.4% 
79 
63.2% 
16.5% 
125 
100.0% 
14.2% 
Lower OBC 78 
56.1% 
19.4% 
61 
43.9% 
12.7% 
139 
100.0% 
15.8% 
Jatav 40 
40.0% 
10.0% 
60 
60.0% 
12.5% 
100 
100.0% 
11.4% 
Other SC 17 
32.7% 
4.2% 
35 
67.3% 
7.3% 
52 
100.0% 
5.9% 
ST 14 
87.5% 
3.5% 
2 
12.5% 
0.4% 
16 
100.0% 
1.8% 
Muslims 49 
37.1% 
12.2% 
83 
62.9% 
17.3% 
132 
100.0% 
15.0% 
Others 9 
39.1% 
2.2% 
14 
60.9% 
2.9% 
23 
100.0% 
2.6% 
Total 402 
45.6% 
100.0% 
479 
54.4% 
100.0% 
881 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Women No Yes Total 
Brahmin 58 
64.4% 
11.4% 
32 
35.6% 
8.7% 
90 
100.0% 
10.3% 
Rajput 23 
51.1% 
4.5% 
22 
48.9% 
6.0% 
45 
100.0% 
5.1% 
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Vaishya 14 
43.8% 
2.8% 
18 
56.3% 
4.9% 
32 
100.0% 
3.7% 
Oth Upper Caste 6 
60.0% 
1.2% 
4 
40.0% 
1.1% 
10 
100.0% 
1.1% 
Jat 12 
50.0% 
2.4% 
12 
50.0% 
3.3% 
24 
100.0% 
2.7% 
Yadav 63 
63.6% 
12.4% 
36 
36.4% 
9.8% 
99 
100.0% 
11.3% 
Oth Peasant OBC 197 
71.8% 
21.1% 
42 
28.2% 
11.4% 
149 
100.0% 
17.0% 
Lower OBC 84 
62.7% 
16.5% 
50 
37.3% 
13.6% 
134 
100.0% 
15.3% 
Jatav 29 
31.5% 
5.7% 
63 
68.5% 
17.1% 
92 
100.0% 
10.5% 
Other SC 29 
53.7% 
5.7% 
25 
46.3% 
6.8% 
54 
100.0% 
6.2% 
ST 6 
60.0% 
1.2% 
4 
40.0% 
1.1% 
10 
100.0% 
1.1% 
Muslims 63 
54.8% 
12.4% 
52 
45.2% 
14.1% 
115 
100.0% 
13.1% 
Others 14 
63.6% 
2.8% 
8 
36.4% 
2.2% 
22 
100.0% 
2.5% 
Total 508 
58.0% 
100.0% 
368 
42.0% 
100.0% 
876 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Source: CSDS data unit 
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Table 7 
Bihar Lok Sabha Postpoll 1999 
Caste/Community/Gender 
Gender  Did you vote   
Men No Yes Total 
Upper Caste 8 
11.0% 
11.3% 
65 
89.0% 
19.9% 
73 
100.0% 
18.3% 
Yadav 10 
16.7% 
14.1% 
50 
83.3% 
15.3% 
60 
100.0% 
15.1% 
Kurmi+Koeri 4 
17.4% 
5.6% 
19 
82.6% 
5.8% 
23 
100.0% 
5.8% 
Other OBC 21 
20.4% 
29.6% 
82 
79.6% 
25.1% 
103 
100.0% 
25.9% 
SC 6 
14.3% 
8.5% 
36 
85.7% 
11.0% 
42 
100.0% 
10.6% 
ST 14 
37.8% 
19.7% 
23 
62.2% 
7.0% 
37 
100.0% 
9.3% 
Muslims 8 
13.8% 
11.3% 
50 
86.2% 
15.3% 
58 
100.0% 
14.6% 
Others  2 
100.0% 
0.6% 
2 
100.0% 
0.5% 
Total 71 
17.8% 
100.0% 
327 
82.2% 
100.0% 
398 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Women No Yes Total 
Upper Caste 33 
45.8% 
13.8% 
39 
54.2% 
16.0% 
72 
100.0% 
14.9% 
 50 
Yadav 35 
53.8% 
14.6% 
30 
46.2% 
12.3% 
65 
100.0% 
13.5% 
Kurmi+Koeri 19 
50.0% 
7.9% 
19 
50.0% 
7.8% 
38 
100.0% 
7.9% 
Other OBC 58 
47.9% 
24.2% 
63 
52.1% 
25.9% 
121 
100.0% 
25.1% 
SC 45 
50.0% 
18.8% 
45 
50.0% 
18.5% 
90 
100.0% 
18.6% 
ST 21 
75.0% 
8.8% 
7 
25.0% 
2.9% 
28 
100.0% 
5.8% 
Muslims 29 
43.3% 
12.1% 
38 
56.7% 
15.6% 
67 
100.0% 
13.9% 
Others  2 
100.0% 
0.8% 
2 
100.0% 
0.4% 
Total 240 
49.7% 
100.0% 
243 
50.3% 
100.0% 
483 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Source: CSDS data unit 
 
Table 8 
Bihar Lok Sabha Postpoll 2004 
Caste/Community/Gender 
Gender  Were you able to vote   
Men Unable to vote Able to vote Total 
Upper caste 44 
30.3% 
23.4% 
101 
69.7% 
23.9% 
145 
100.0% 
23.8% 
Yadav 11 
17.5% 
5.9% 
52 
82.5% 
12.3% 
63 
100.0% 
10.3% 
 51 
Kurmi+Koeri 16 
26.2% 
8.5% 
45 
73.8% 
10.7% 
61 
10.0% 
10.0% 
Oth OBC 55 
35.9% 
29.3% 
98 
64.1% 
23.2% 
153 
100.0% 
25.1% 
SC 46 
45.5% 
24.5% 
55 
54.5% 
13.0% 
101 
100.0% 
16.6% 
Muslims 16 
22.5% 
8.5% 
55 
77.5% 
13.0% 
71 
100.0% 
11.6% 
Others  16 
100.0% 
3.8% 
16 
100.0% 
2.6% 
Total 188 
30.8% 
100.0% 
422 
69.2% 
100.0% 
610 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Women Unable to vote Able to vote  
Upper caste 60 
50.8% 
19.3% 
58 
49.2% 
21.8% 
118 
100.0% 
20.5% 
Yadav 21 
38.2% 
6.8% 
34 
61.8% 
12.8% 
55 
100.0% 
9.5% 
Kurmi+Koeri 39 
59.1% 
12.5% 
27 
40.9% 
10.2% 
66 
100.0% 
11.4% 
Oth OBC 87 
58.8% 
28.0% 
61 
41.2% 
22.9% 
148 
100.0% 
25.6% 
SC 53 
63.1% 
17.0% 
31 
36.9% 
11.7% 
84 
100.0% 
14.6% 
Muslims 44 
49.4% 
14.1% 
45 
50.6% 
16.9% 
89 
100.0% 
15.4% 
 52 
Others 7 
41.2% 
2.3% 
10 
58.8% 
3.8% 
17 
100.0% 
2.9% 
Total 311 
53.9% 
100.0% 
266 
46.1% 
100.0% 
577 
100.0% 
100.0% 
Source: CSDS data unit 
 
 
Figure 1 
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Source: Election Commission website – www.eci.gov.in 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
Size of Electorate
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